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Abstract. Wireless network technologies offer ubiquitous broadband
access to millions of users at an affordable cost. However, the broad-
band nature of the wireless medium make these networks vulnerable to
a number of attacks. Malicious interference at the physical layer, and
extended packet collisions at the medium access layer can cause signifi-
cant DoS attacks. In this work, we show how off-the-shelf hardware can
be used to create devastating DoS attacks in a IEEE 802.11 network.
Moreover, we present two algorithms for attack detection that are based
on the cumulative sum algorithm.
1 Introduction
Network proliferation has been remarkable, especially during the last decade.
Technology advancements in the area of network communications have offered
high performance improvement and ubiquitous Internet access. From the era of
the early-stage communication protocols (e.g. Aloha) through the active net-
works [1], and software-defined networks [2], ubiquitous network access has been
achieved thanks to the advances in wireless technologies. A number of commu-
nication protocols (IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.15.4, IEEE 802.16, etc.) enable en-
ergy efficient communications in relatively large distances. Thousands of smart
phones and other wireless clients can now enjoy any-time any-where Internet
connectivity.
Nevertheless, the broadcast nature of the wireless medium make wireless
communications susceptible to a number of threats. Adversaries can cause se-
vere Denial-of-Service attacks (DoS) by exploiting a number of vulnerabilities.
DoS attacks pose a major threat in every communication system, often with
catastrophic results as wireless communications are nowadays used in many ap-
plications (e.g. smart cards [3]). At the physical layer, adversaries can gener-
ate malicious interference resulting in heavy packet loss in the network. At the
medium access (MAC) layer, malicious users can create extended packet colis-
sions, causing severe DoS attacks in the wireless network. Throughout this work
we refer to adversaries and malicious users as jammers.
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Our contribution focuses on showing how off-the-shelf equipment can be used
to create DoS attacks at the physical, and medium access layers. We also present
two algorithms for the detection of these attacks. The rest of this paper is orga-
nized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic components of our off-the-shelf
jammer. Section 3 describes how malicious interference can be used to create DoS
attacks. In Section 4 we demonstrate how extended packet colissions are easily
caused by jammers, and how greedy behaviors affect network’s performance. Sec-
tion 5 presents two algorithms for attack detection based on the cumulative-sum
algorith. Finally, conclusions appear in Section 6.
2 Off-the-shelf hardware for malicious purposes
As mentioned in the previous section, wireless networks, due to their broad-
cast nature, are susceptible to a number of threats. A major threat referred as
physical-layer jamming refers to interference created by a malicious node. There
is a number of commercial devices that can be used for this purpose (e.g. [4–6]).
Nevertheless, as we show in this paper, off-the-shelf hardware can be successfully
used to launch severe DoS attacks in a wireless network.
Our jamming equipment is based on a mini-ITX board (Fig. 1) carrying 512
MB of RAM with a 80 GB disk. The wireless interface cards are based on the
Atheros 802.11a/b/g CM9-GP mini-PCI card. Furthermore, Ath5k [7], an open
source IEEE 802.11 driver is used, on Gentoo Linux.
Fig. 1: Off-the-shelf jamming device
The software part of the jammer is shown in Fig. 2. This consists of several
components implemented in both the kernel and user spaces of the Linux op-
erating system. At user-space, the command repository contains all the attack
characteristics. These define a detailed adversary model to be used against a
wireless network. Such a typical model can describe, for example, the wireless
channel to be attacked, the attack intensity in terms of packet rate, transmis-
sion power, attack duration, etc. Commands are propagated through the netlink
socket interface to kernel-space, stored in the command trace collection module
that provides buffering capabilities. Finally, the characteristics of the adversary
model are used to setup several parameters of the Ath5k driver in order to make
an attack feasible.
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Fig. 2: Jammer software layout
3 Physical-layer attacks
A major threat in wireless networks is interference that is caused by signal emis-
sions in neighboring channels. In general, interference can be characterized as
malicious or non-malicious, depending on the incentives of the interferer. Non-
malicious interference can be caused by nearby legitimate nodes that operate
in neighboring channels ([8]). Malicious physical-layer interference (jamming) is
created by signal emissions in neighboring channels. This affects both the trans-
mitters and the receivers of a wireless network. IEEE 802.11 transmitters sense
the wireless medium before any transmission takes place. If the measured noise
is above a threshold, they refrain from transmission for some random time. So,
if a jammer is present, the transmission operations of the legitimate nodes can
be heavily disrupted, hence DoS attacks become feasible. On the other hand,
legitimate receivers cannot correctly detect and decode incoming packets in the
presence of jammer. This is due to the excessive noise generated in their vicin-
ity that leads to an extensive packet loss. Moreover, as packets are lost in the
network, further retransmissions by the transmitters take place causing severe
network disruption.
In order to demonstrate the effects of physical-layer jamming we use a single
off-the-shelf jammer with characteristics as described in Section 2. The specific
type of jammer does not follow any rules of the IEEE 802.11 protocol, so it
freely performs jamming even if legitimate transmissions are taking place. We
setup a network of four legitimate nodes: Sender, Receiver, Monitor1, and Mon-
itor2. Packets flow from Sender to Receiver, while periodic jamming using the
frequency of the neighboring channel is taking place. Receiver, Monitor1, and
Monitor2 record the packets that belong to the legitimate traffic, and for every
recorded packet, the SINR (Signal-to-Interference plus Noise Ratio) is computed,
taking into account the power leakage in the neighboring channels as described
in [9]. Fig. 3 shows how SINR substantially drops during the jamming attacks
(symbolized by the orthogonal boxes at the bottom of each graph).
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Fig. 3: SINR variations during the jamming attacks
When SINR significantly drops, a wireless receiver often becomes unable
to detect and further decode a transmitted packet. This results to packet loss,
throughput degradation, as well as energy waste, as transmitters keep re-transmitting
packets. Fig. 4 shows the retry attempts of the transmitter (Sender), the through-
put at the Receiver, and the total packet loss in the network when a jammer is
present. Retry attempts increase up to five times during jamming, while through-
put drops to about 1 Mbps (from 15 Mbps when no jamming takes place), and
packet loss increases over 60%.
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Fig. 4: Performance degradation during the jamming attacks
4 MAC layer attacks
IEEE 802.11 is a CSMA/CA (carrier sense multiple access with collision avoid-
ance) based medium access protocol. Each potential transmitter has to first sense
the wireless medium, and if it is free, transmission takes place. However, if the
medium is occupied, it has to enter a back-off stage where it waits for some
amount of time before repeating the same procedure (sensing, etc) [10].
4.1 Denial-of-service attacks through packet collisions
Attackers can exploit the CSMA/CA mechanism of IEEE 802.11 by emitting en-
ergy when the wireless medium is occupied by a legitimate node. At this point,
jammer emits energy on the same channel legitimate nodes use for communica-
tion, aiming to cause packet collisions and to degrade network’s performance.
Packet collisions refer to captured packets that mainly suffer from CRC (cyclic
redundancy check) errors. Fig. 5 shows the ratio of the corrupted packets (CRC
errors) over the correctly decoded ones, captured in a single receiver when a
periodic jammer is present. Jammer operates on the same channel used for the
legitimate communication. Observe that the ratio exceeds 60% when jamming
traffic is emitted. This is a severe DoS attack as corrupted packets are essentially
lost packets that the sender will attempt to re-transmit up to a number of times
(retry limit).
Next, we demonstrate how jamming on the same channel affects the perfor-
mance of video transmission in the wireless network. For this reason, we set up
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Fig. 5: Ratio of corrupted packets over the correctly decoded ones
a testbed consisting of a video server, a video client and the jammer described
in Section 2. Encoded MPEG-4 video is transmitted from server to client us-
ing RTP/UDP packets. Periodic jamming takes place in the network. We mea-
sure video’s performance using PSNR (Peak-Signal-to-Noise Ratio), an objective
quality metric widely used to measure video performance. Supposing there are
two m×n images S and D, where S is the original image and D the reconstructed
image, the PSNR of this image is given by:
PSNR = 20× log10 Vpeak√
MSE
(1)
where V peak is its maximum value (e.g. 255 for 8-bit encoding), and MSE
is the mean squared error given by:
MSE =
1
m× n
m−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=0
[S(i, j)−D(i, j)]2 (2)
Fig. 6 [11] shows the PSNR for each received video frame, and for two exper-
iments: (i) when no jamming is used (No Jam), and (ii) when jammer is active
periodically for a duration of 80 seconds (Jam). Observe that PSNR significantly
drops when jamming is taking place.
4.2 Greedy behavior
The CSMA/CA mechanism of IEEE 802.11 requires that potential transmitters
should wait for some time when the wireless medium is busy in order to decrease
the colission probability. The waiting time (back-off time) is chosen uniformly
Fig. 6: PSNR per frame
in the interval [0 − CW ], where CW is the contention window size. Initially,
CW equals CWmin, that is the minimum contention window. Each time a node
finds the wireless medium busy, it doubles CW up to CWmax. When a sucessful
transmission takes place, CW redudes to CWmin.
This mechanism can be exploited by a malicious (or greedy) node assigning
a very small value to its CWmin. With a small CWmin, the malicious node can
monopolize the medium and make the legitimate nodes entering the back-off
stage repeatedly. Fig. 7 shows the throughput achieved by four wireless nodes
when all attempt to transmit a UDP flow of 200 Kbytes to a single access point,
without the presence of a greedy node.
Next, Node1 becomes greedy by periodically assigning a very small value to
its CWmin. Repeating the same experiment, in Fig. 8 we show that Node1’s
throughput increases from about 200 Kbytes/sec to 350 Kbytes/sec while the
throughput of the rest of the nodes falls almost to 100 Kbytes/sec. Node1 be-
comes greedy every 10 seconds for a duration of 10 seconds. After that period,
it stops behaving greedy by assigning a proper value to its CWmin.
Such greedy behaviors negatively affect legitimate nodes performance reduc-
ing the fairness of the wireless system. Fairness is related to the ability of the
MAC layer to equitably share a common channel between a number of contend-
ing nodes [12]. Jain’s fairness index [13] is widely used as a metric to measure
the fairness of a system. Assuming that N is the number of competing flows and
γi the fraction of packets from node i that arrived within a time window, Jain’s
index is defined as follows:
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Fig. 7: Throughput with the absence of a greedy node
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Fig. 8: Throughput with the presence of a greedy node (Node1)
F =
(
N∑
i=1
γi)
2
N ×
N∑
i=1
γ2i
(3)
When F = 1 perfect fairness is achieved, while when F = 1N absolute unfairness
is achieved.
Fig. 9a shows how the fairness of the network drops when one of the nodes
becomes greedy. Observe that as the number of flows decreases, the drop in
fairness increases. This is because less nodes content for the medium, hence it is
easier for the greedy node to monopolize it by selecting a small CWmin value.
On the other hand, if no greedy node is present, fairness increases, for all flows
(Fig. 9b).
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Fig. 9: Fairness for a different number of flows
5 Attack detection
In this section we describe techniques for the detection of physical-layer jamming,
and collisions at the MAC layer. As shown in Fig. 3, jamming causes extended
SINR drops. Based on this, we deploy a cumulative-sum (cusum) algorithm [14]
able to detect abrupt changes of the SINR. In previous works [15, 11, 16, 17] we
show that maximum performance, in terms of false alarms/detection probability,
is achieved when considering the maximum minus the minimum values of SINR
within a short and long windows. Cusum is defined as:
yn =
{
yn−1 + Zn − a if yn ≥ 0
0 if yn < 0
(4)
Zn is the expectation of a specific metric that changes whenever jamming takes
place (in our case the SINR-based metric), and a ∈ R+ controls its drift. Fur-
thermore, Zn is given by Zn = D(n)− D¯(n), where
D(n) = max
n−K+1<i≤n
xi − min
n−K+1<i≤n
xi ,
and
D¯(n) =
∑n
i=n−M+1D(i)
M
,
During the jamming attacks, cusum’s output increases as shown in Fig. 10, and
when it exceeds a predefined threshold, an alarm is raised.
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Fig. 10: Cusum’s output
We use the same technique for the detection of MAC layer attacks in cases
where an adversary causes packet colissions in the network. Rather than using
the SINR as metric for the cusum, we consider the ratio of the corrupted packets
over the correctly decoded ones (Fig. 4). Cusum’s output increases similarly as
in Fig. 10 indicating the attack.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we demonstrated how commodity hardware can be used as jammer
and severely affect network’s performance. At the physical layer, jammer can cre-
ate malicious interference that substantially degrades network performance. At
the MAC layer, jammer can create extended packet collisions by energy emis-
sion when legitimate wireless traffic is being transmitted. Furthermore, a greedy
node by exploiting the back-off mechanism of IEEE 802.11, can monopolize the
medium, restricting network resources to the non-misbehaving nodes.
Efficient detection of these attacks is feasible by considering an SINR-based
metric at the physical layer, and the ratio of the corrupted packets over the
correctly decodes ones at the MAC layer. Both metrics are utilized by a cusum
algorithm that signals an alarm if a predefined threshold has been exceeded.
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